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Battle, n. A  method of untying with the teeth a political knot that
would not yield to the tongue.
- Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary (1911)1
In the wake o f  September 1 lth, Attorney General John
Ashcroft, i n  a  graduation address at  the University o f  Missouri
Columbia School of Law, said
Our system of justice balances contention with consen-
sus because, in the marketplace of justice, a monopoly
on litigation serves to alienate the people from the law
— and distances the legal profession from those it serves.
As a young lawyer, Abraham Lincoln encouraged his
colleagues to seek compromise whenever possible. "As
a peacemaker, the lawyer has a superior opportunity to
be a good man," said Lincoln. "There will be business
enough."2
For judge advocates (JAGs) to focus exclusively on litigation
skills is akin to shooting first and asking questions later. To  attorneys
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in the modern day coliseum who enjoy the heat of battle, the word
"negotiation" conjures up visions o f  granola eating, tie-dye clad,
Birkenstock wearing beatniks romping through daisy filled fields
singing "kum-bay-ya." O r  worse, the word "negotiation" implies
weakness — that you will have to "give in" or you have a "dog" for a
case. Contrary to popular belief, negotiations skills are indispensable
to us as Air Force attorneys, even in areas where you would not nor-
mally think to use them.
We know negotiations can resolve contract disputes and labor
problems, and in the Air Force, these skills have been used with much
success.3 However, we need to consider where attorneys can utilize
negotiation skills in other areas of  our practice — for example, as a
deployed KA. Everyone agrees JAGs in these billets need to be well
versed in the substantive areas of the law: fiscal law, military justice,
claims, the law of armed conflict, but they also need to know how to
effectively interact in their environment with a variety of key players:
the deployed commanders, community leaders, MAJCOM and NAF
lawyers, host-nation representatives, sister service members and mem-
bers of multi-national forces. One might think that any environment
involving military forces would be marked by a well-defined chain of
command outlining clear lines of authority. I n  the classic military sit-
uation, there is no "negotiation;" rather, it is merely a matter of obedi-
ence to orders.
The reality, however, can be quite different. A s  already indi-
cated, in many of today's operational situations military commanders
are obliged to interact with entities over whom they exercise no legal
authority. There are other players, such as allies or coalition partners
over whom they may conceptually exercise authority, but with whom
practical experience dictates the wisdom of a more reciprocal arrange-
ment. Finally, there are internal audiences — to include sister services
— with whom productive professional interaction is often marked by
collaborative approaches. I n  each instance, obtaining the right end
state frequently requires persuasion of the parties. Thus, JAGs can be
the most valuable members of a commander's staff because we are pro-
fessionally trained in persuasion, but we can be even more valuable i f
we are also professionally trained in negotiation. Accordingly, negoti-
ations skills should be a part of every JAG's "toolkit."
The Process
When most JAGs think of "negotiation," what they're probably
thinking of is distributive bargaining Distributive bargaining is what
happens when the parties believe there is a "fixed pie" to divide. More
for one means less for the other. The hallmark of the distributive nego-
tiator is positional bargaining. A  particular solution or position is
established and argued for throughout the negotiation. To  ensure the
position is satisfied, the negotiator takes an extreme stance and makes
few concessions. I n  a two-party negotiation where both are positional
bargainers, the negotiation itself resembles a dance. One starts high,
the other starts low and they both move back and forth towards the
middle...a negotiation dance.
Interest-based negotiation on the other hand assumes mutual
gain is possible. Instead of focusing on positions, the parties focus on
interests. The difference between the two types of negotiation is illus-
trated by a story about two sisters and an orange!" Each sister insisted
on having all of the only orange. After some discussion, they agreed to
split the orange down the middle and each take half; a distributive bar-
gaining result. One sister took her half, threw away the fruit and used
the peel to bake a cake. The other sister used her half to make juice,
throwing away the peel. H a d  the sisters used an interest-based
approach, they would have arrived at a much different result leaving
them each better off.
There are seven elements in the interest-based approach to
negotiating: interests, options, alternatives, relationship, communica-
tion, standards and commitment. Each of these elements is discussed
in more detail below and illustrated with a real world example.
Interests. Focusing on positions in a negotiation stifles cre-
ativity. Focusing on interests builds toward expanding the resource
"pie." Positions are solutions to a problem and require justification.
They are one way to satisfy interests. Interests are reasons for under-
lying positions or why a particular solution (or position) is preferred.
As Roger Fisher and William Ury in their seminal book on this process,
Getting to Yes, say "interests motivate people; they are the silent
movers behind the hubbub of  positions."5 Even when positions are
opposed, the interests behind those positions may reveal more common
ground between the parties than may first seem apparent.
When considering interests, Fisher and Ury stress that negotia-
tors must remember that basic human needs like security, recognition
and self-worth, motivate all people. They contend that " i f  you take
care of such basic needs, you increase the chance of reaching an agree-
ment and, if an agreement is reached, of the other side's keeping to it."6
In the book Thirteen Days, Robert Kennedy says of the Cuban missile
crisis, "I believe the course that we ultimately would have taken would
have been quite different and filled with far greater risks. The fact that
we were able to talk, debate, argue, disagree, and then debate some
more was essential in choosing our ultimate course."7 He refers to the
discussions that occurred between the members of the "Ex Comm,"8
but that statement applies with equal force to the session he had with
Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on the eve of  military action
between the United States and the Soviet Union. A t  that meeting, the
Soviet ambassador raised the question of removing U.S. missiles from
Turkey, ostensibly in exchange for the Soviet removal of missiles from
Cuba. The attorney general responded:
There could be no quid pro quo or any arrangement
made under this kind of threat or pressure, and that in
the last analysis this was a decision that would have to
be made by NATO. However, I said, President Kennedy
had been anxious to remove those missiles from Turkey
and Italy for a long period of time. He had ordered their
removal some time ago, and it was our judgment that,
within a short time after this crisis was over, those mis-
siles would be gone
The next day, Kbrushchev agreed to dismantle and withdraw
the missiles in Cuba. Th i s  example illustrates how "saving
face" can be one of the basic human needs Fisher and Ury high-
light. I t  was politically important for Khrushchev at the time to
be able to show other members of his government that he "got
something" in return for removing the missiles from Cuba.
Obviously, you need to understand your own interests, but to
reach an agreement, you must also consider the interests of the other
party. One way to do this is to ask yourself "if I were in their shoes,
what would I care about?" For every position they take, ask "why?" I f
you suggest an option and they dismiss it, ask "why won't that work?" 10
The answers to these questions reveal interests that underlie positions.
To illustrate, during Operation Provide Relief (the airlift of food
and medical supplies into Somalia during the famine and discord of the
early 1990s), an allied air force joined the effort. The allied comman-
der made repeated requests for an agreement with the U.S. commander
putting his aircraft under U.S. control. However, U.S. law and regula-
tion did not allow the American commander to enter into such agree-
ments." I n  the discussions that followed, it became apparent that the
ally, who was conducting its first out-of-country military operation
since World War II, wanted to assure domestic and international audi-
ences that it was acting not unilaterally but rather in complete cooper-
ation with an established U.S. humanitarian enterprise. Once the real
interest was understood, a solution was achieved by simply arranging
for a much-reported "photo op" featuring the U.S. and allied staffs.
Once you understand the interests, you need to prioritize them
— yours and theirs. This is important for two reasons. First, it will help
achieve the optimal result.12 Second, prioritizing interests helps brain-
storm and evaluate options, the next element.
Options. Options are ways to resolve a dispute. Creative
options satisfy mutual interests and make up the expanded "pie." Once
you know the parties' interests and priorities, you can brainstorm
options. It's important to separate the act of inventing options from the
act of deciding between thern.13 Get the options on the table and then
identify which best satisfy the parties' interests. Look for ways to cre-
ate value. For instance, anything you value highly and which the other
party does not, presents an opportunity to create value. Other value
creating opportunities involve differences in risk aversion, time prefer-
ences and resources. Can one party bear more risk than the other? Are
there different assets to trade? Do you have different needs concerning
when things happen?14
Creative options were used with much success during a
deployment to a major base in the Middle East in support of Joint Task
Force Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA). The problem arose because U.S.
law limited the funding of the construction of a dining hall facility such
that a new parking lot could not be part of the project. After exploring
many possibilities, the U.S. team realized that allies used the facility,
and that the parking lot would benefit all concerned. Once this was
brought to the attention of coalition partners, they offered to build the
parking lot as a cooperative endeavor. There was not actually a formal,
negotiated international agreement reached with the coalition partners,
as there was a realization that such would require complicated arrange-
ments and approvals o f  their respective governments. Instead, the
option that emerged was something within the authority of the respec-
tive groups. I n  this instance, the allied forces came to their own con-
clusion that the construction of the parking lot was in their best inter-
est (given the dust-suppression qualities, i t  wasn't surprising!), and
actually less costly than building facilities for each force.
Alternatives. Options are contrasted with alternatives. Since
not every negotiation ends in an agreement, you need to think about
alternatives. Whereas options require both parties to agree, alternatives
are actions one party can take alone, or at least without the involvement
of the party now sitting on the other side. In  a legal dispute, one alter-
native available to both parties is usually to file a lawsuit. Whether that
is the best alternative, is another story. When approaching a negotia-
tion, you need to know your best alternative to a negotiated agreement,
commonly referred to as BATNA. What is the most beneficial thing
you can do for yourself if you can't reach an agreement? What are the
negative consequences from walking away from the table? Knowing
your BATNA allows you to determine whether the outcome of your
negotiation is a success. I f  the deal isn't better than your BATNA, then
you should walk away. I f  you haven't thought about your BATNA
ahead of time, you won't know whether you should stay at the table or
walk. Likewise, you should consider what the other side will do i f  an
agreement can't be reached. I f  you don't consider the other side's
BATNA, you won't have any idea of when they will stay at the table.
In the example above, not building a parking area was one alter-
native. Another would have been to relocate the dining hall to another
facility that already had a paved lot.
Relationship. One of the most common mistakes in a negotia-
tion is not "separating the people from the problem."15 During the
negotiation, you need to sever your personal feelings about the person
on the other side of the table from the problem you are trying to solve.
Consider what your relationship is now and what you want it to be in
the future. Even in negotiations where you may be inclined to dismiss
this element, don't give in to this temptation. For example, we have all
probably at one time bought a car. O f  course, a car dealer isn't the most
sympathetic party and when you're in the process of  dealing with a
salesperson, you may be tempted to tell them to take a long walk off a
short pier. But what if you need your car serviced and they are the only
place in town that works on the type of car you own? I f  you weren't
concerned about the nature of the relationship when you bought the car,
you may be later.
Consider that judge advocates are often tasked with serving as
the liaison with host nation officials. I t  is quite possible that the cus-
toms and culture of certain nations are not only inconsistent with those
of the U.S., but offensive to American sensibilities. Nevertheless,
judge advocates must work through these issues, finding common
ground and demonstrating respect when possible and appropriate.
Educating yourself in advance about the host nation and its history and
mores is vital. The bottom-line is to avoid being distracted from your
negotiating goal; remember, it's not about you.
Communication. Communication is the "mother" of negotia-
tion. You need to be aware of how the type of communication you are
using can impact the process (e.g., e-mail, letter, face-to-face). Good
communication reduces misunderstandings and makes the process
more efficient. Efficiency is particularly important in a deployed set-
ting where short timelines mean you can't resort to "traditional" dis-
pute resolution systems. Good negotiators listen actively and acknowl-
edge what the other side is saying. I f  there are cultural differences
between the parties, the good negotiator researches the other party's
culture to learn things that are important to communication in that cul-
ture.
Consider this example, during an exercise in the Middle East an
issue involving the Ottawa Convention16 arose with a major ally. The
Ottawa Convention contains various prohibitions involving the use of
anti-personnel mines. The U.S. is not a party to this treaty, and contin-
ues to employ munitions that contain them. The allied commander rep-
resented a nation that had ratified the convention and thus believed he
was precluded completely from participating with U.S. forces i f  such
weapons' system was used.
Effective communication was the solution. With the help of the
allied nation's deployed judge advocate, an Air Force lawyer located
the text o f  the allied nation's implementing legislation via a web
search. T h e  statutory language revealed the circumstances under
which the allied nation's forces could provide limited, indirect support
to non-party nations such as the U.S. This information was famished
to the allied commander via his own judge advocate. This underlines
the importance of not just what is communicated, but how.
Standards. This is also called "legitimacy" or "objective crite-
ria." These are things independent of the parties or external to the
negotiation used to evaluate options. What method can you and the
other party use to judge the fairness of your deal? Industry standards?
Precedent? Pol icy? A  contract? T h e  law? Kel ly 's Blue Book?
Standards are important because they give the parties a way to evalu-
ate options to determine whether the proposed agreement is a "good
deal." Standards are especially important when trust between the par-
ties is shaky, or one or both sides need to show to a third party that the
deal is "fair" or "reasonable."
In deployed situations, the "standards" may often be treaties
and other international agreements. What is surprising to many JAGs
in deployed situations is to learn that some host nation officials and
even coalition partners may not, at the proverbial "worker bee" level,
be aware of what agreements their countries have made with the U.S.,
or what treaties their nation has ratified.
Another aspect of this issue in the deployed environment relates
to the limitations of U.S. law." Many — if not most — countries do not
have, for example, the same kinds of restrictions in the fiscal law arena
as does the U.S. Thus, the legal difficulties faced by U.S. commanders
in providing logistical support, loaning equipment, constructing or
repairing facilities, etc., often is not well understood. The perceived
failure to provide such support might be misinterpreted. Accordingly,
it may be useful to provide your counterpart with copies of the law or
policy which sets the parameters.
Commitment. The last element is closing the deal — commit-
ment. How will the agreement be implemented? Do the parties at the
table have the authority to do the deal? How are you going to memo-
rialize your agreement? A contract? A handshake? Who is going to do
what? I t  is vitally important to the longevity of your agreement that
everyone is clear on what they are going to do and when. Failure to do
so can result in another trip to the negotiating table, or worse, a trip to
the courthouse.
Once again it  is important to consider culture when dealing
with international counterparts. For some, a handshake may be all that
is needed; others expect and require a formal document, as would be
the norm in most Western countries. That said, one impact of global-
ization is that even in areas which traditionally did not rely upon for-
mal documents, there is a greater realization that such is the expected
international norm. Obviously, in many instances there may be a lan-
guage challenges, so be sure that everyone has the right understanding.
Now that you have an understanding of the process,18 how do
these skills translate into a deployed setting? First, appreciate that
Status of Forces Agreements, regulations, etc. may simply be starting
points for discussion. Second, understand the official and unofficial
ground rules of your environment. Third, there is no substitute for sub-
stantive knowledge — preparation is vital. Fourth, there is no replace-
ment for a "target study" of  your counterpart in dispute resolution.
Fifth, build relationships before the crisis. Sixth, accept that someone
else may have a better idea. And finally, it's usually best not to cele-
brate a "victory."
You must prepare, prepare, prepare. Litigators would never
dream (we hope) of walking into a courtroom unprepared. The same
holds true for negotiators. The seven elements should be evaluated
prior to your negotiation not only from your own perspective, but also
from the other side's point of view. Practice, practice, practice. This is
a skill. Your  effectiveness increases the more you use it. Use it at
home, when you buy your next car, or even the next time you talk about
a pre-trial agreement.
Conclusion
Now, i f  you still think these skills are for non-gladiators or the
weak of  heart, consider this: even one of  Attila the Hun's alleged
"leadership secrets" was the "art of negotiation." He reportedly said "it
is never wise to gain by battle what may be gained through bloodless
negotiations."19 In this regard, he had several "pointers":
• Never trust negotiation to luck. Enter every session with
knowledge of the enemy's strengths and weaknesses;
• Time is your ally when you're negotiating. I t  calms tem-
peraments and gives rise to less spirited perspectives;
• Never arbitrate. Arbitration allows a third party to deter-
mine your destiny;
• Never make negotiations difficult on immediate, lesser
points, at the cost of a greater outcome. Acquiescence
on lesser issues softens the spirit of your adversary;
• In negotiation you must take well-studied risks. Try  to
foresee all possible outcomes to determine those that
will yield favorable results;
• Honor all commitments you make during negotiations
lest your enemy fail to trust your word in the future;
• Be bold in facing the inevitable. Acquiesce when resis-
tance would be pointless or when your victory can be
gained only at too high a cost. O f  this you may not
approve, but it is your duty to do so for the good of all
Huns;
• Be keenly aware of time. Present appealing alternatives
that are appropriate to your opponent's situation at the
moment of your negotiations. Otherwise, he will dis-
miss your propositions.213
In fact, there are striking similarities between these pointers and
the approach we have discussed here. But, don't just take it from us.
Attorneys in the trenches also recommend conflict resolution training
for those deploying to parts unknown. I n  one after action report from
a recent deployment, a perceptive deployed Staff Judge Advocate, said
this:
Because I was somewhat "above the fray" when it came
to balancing competing interests, and because personnel
turned over so quickly, I often found myself acting as a
mediator. I n  a similar vein, because commanders and
agency chiefs come from a broad range of backgrounds
(different MAJCOMs, different airframes, active-duty
versus AFRES versus ANG), issues sometimes became
stalled because of  uncertainty or a lack of familiarity.
As a judge advocate, I could sometimes break a logjam
by providing a "working text" or at least a neutral view-
point from which parties could build. 21
We couldn't have said it better ourselves.
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